When Stellantis announced €22 billion in write-downs, the headlines focused on the stock’s 28% collapse. But beneath the surface, a more dangerous story emerged: approximately 2,300 structured products (produits structurés) linked to Stellantis shares are now threatening French savers’ capital. With an estimated €5 billion in exposure through CGP (Conseillers en Gestion de Patrimoine, or wealth management advisors) networks, many investors who believed they were buying “prudent” products with 50% protection barriers are now facing losses they never saw coming.
The Stock Plunge That Was Just the Beginning
On February 6, 2026, Stellantis shares did something that caught even seasoned traders off guard: they dropped 28% in a single day. The trigger was a brutal announcement, €22 billion in “exceptional charges” (charges exceptionnelles) tied to what management called an “overestimation of the electrification pace.” In plain English, the company had bet billions on electric vehicles that customers didn’t want to buy.
But while financial news outlets focused on the immediate market drama, a quieter crisis was unfolding in French wealth management offices. As one portfolio manager at Mirabaud noted during a BFM Business segment, the real question wasn’t just about Stellantis’s future, it was about the thousands of structured products built on its shares that were now in danger territory.
The Hidden Web: 2,300 Products and €5 Billion in Exposure
Here’s where it gets uncomfortable for French savers. According to data from Structured Retail Products, there are currently 2,300 “live” structured products linked to Stellantis shares on the French market. These aren’t exotic derivatives held by hedge funds, they’re retail products sold through CGP networks to ordinary investors seeking “safe” returns.
One CGP network alone had over €900 million in exposure. Across the entire market, industry insiders estimate total exposure at €5 billion. That’s not a typo, five billion euros of French household savings are now at risk because of one car company’s strategic miscalculation.
The mechanics are deceptively simple. These products typically work like this:
– You invest a lump sum for 3-5 years
– You receive an attractive annual coupon (often 5-8%)
– Your capital is “protected” by a barrier, usually around 50% of the initial stock price
– If the stock stays above that barrier, you get your capital back
The problem? Stellantis shares have now fallen so far that many of these barriers are being breached. And unlike a direct stock investment where you can see your losses in real-time, structured product investors often won’t know they’re in trouble until maturity, sometimes years from now.
How “Protection” Becomes a Trap
The word “protection” sounds reassuring, but in structured products, it’s a technical term with dangerous nuances. Most barriers are calculated “après décrément” (after decrement), meaning they adjust downward as the stock falls. But there’s a limit.
When BFM Business asked Frédéric Rozier of Mirabaud whether the Stellantis collapse threatened structured products, his answer was unequivocal: the situation had moved into loss-absorption territory. In other words, the safety nets were failing.
The uncomfortable reality of these products is that they’re built on short put options, meaning the bank selling them profits if the stock stays stable, but the investor absorbs losses if it collapses. When stocks like Stellantis drop below key thresholds, the banks’ hedging activity can actually accelerate the decline, creating a feedback loop that pushes prices further down.
This is exactly what happened with Stellantis. As the stock fell through technical support levels, dealers had to sell more shares to hedge their positions, amplifying the downward move. It’s a phenomenon called “gamma pressure”, and it turns a bad situation into a catastrophic one.
The CGP Dilemma: Commission vs. Client Interest
Why were so many CGPs recommending Stellantis-linked products in the first place? The answer lies in the economics of French wealth management.
Structured products pay generous commissions to advisors, often 2-3% upfront, plus ongoing trail fees. For a CGP managing hundreds of client relationships, recommending a “safe” product from a household name like Stellantis was an easy sell. The client gets a nice coupon, the advisor gets paid, everyone’s happy.
Until they’re not.
Industry insiders report that some CGP networks with “aggressive” fee practices are now heavily exposed. One network had €50 million in exposure, all from products sold on commission. The more “clean” networks? They kept exposure under 1%, and only used products without decrement features.
The difference is stark: one business model prioritizes recurring revenue, the other prioritizes capital preservation. As one industry commentator noted, “La marée baisse, on va voir qui est nu” (When the tide goes out, you see who’s swimming naked).
The Regulatory Blind Spot
French regulators have long been concerned about structured products. The AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers) has repeatedly warned that these instruments are often misunderstood by retail investors. But warnings only go so far when banks and CGPs have powerful incentives to keep selling.
The Stellantis case exposes a critical gap: while regulators focus on disclosure documents and risk warnings, they don’t limit concentration risk. There’s no rule preventing a CGP from selling Stellantis-linked products to hundreds of clients, creating a systemic exposure that could wipe out years of savings if the company fails.
This isn’t just a theoretical risk. Stellantis’s market cap is now below its 2023 net profit. The company is trading at levels that suggest serious distress. And unlike a government bond or diversified fund, this is a single-stock bet dressed up as a sophisticated investment.
The parallels with other complex financial products are striking. When complex financial engineering meets retail investors, the results can be devastating. The same patterns of misaligned incentives and hidden risks that plague synthetic ETFs are now playing out in the structured product market.
What Affected Investors Should Do Now
If you own a structured product linked to Stellantis, here’s what you need to know:
First, check your contract. Look for the barrier level and whether it includes decrement. If the stock is below that barrier, your capital is already at risk, even if your statement doesn’t show it yet.
Second, understand your timeline. These products often have 3-5 year maturities. If you’re two years in with three years left, you can’t just sell without penalties. But you need to know what you’re facing.
Third, talk to your CGP, but be skeptical. Ask direct questions:
– What exactly is my barrier level?
– Is the product with or without decrement?
– What are my options for early redemption?
If your advisor seems evasive or claims they didn’t understand the risks themselves, that’s a red flag. The “I didn’t know” defense doesn’t fly when they collected a commission on the sale.
Fourth, consider legal options. French law provides strong protections for retail investors. If you were sold a product that didn’t match your risk profile, or if the risks weren’t properly explained, you may have recourse through the médiateur de la banque or even legal action.
The Bigger Picture: Systemic Risk in French Savings
The Stellantis debacle is a warning shot for the entire French wealth management industry. It reveals how supposedly “prudent” products can hide concentrated risks that neither investors nor regulators fully appreciate.
This isn’t just about one car company. It’s about a business model that rewards complexity over transparency, and commissions over client outcomes. The same dynamics are playing out across French finance, from pension product mis-selling to speculative investment fads.
The timing is particularly sensitive. French households are already anxious about their financial future. With pension system reforms creating generational uncertainty and inflation eroding purchasing power, the last thing savers need is to discover their “safe” investments are anything but.
Lessons for the Future
The Stellantis structured product crisis teaches several hard lessons:
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Concentration risk is real. A product tied to a single stock, no matter how “blue chip”, is never truly safe. Diversification isn’t just a buzzword, it’s capital preservation.
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Commission structures matter. When advisors get paid upfront for selling complex products, their incentives diverge from yours. Ask how your CGP gets paid.
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Read the fine print. Terms like “décrément” and “barrière de protection” aren’t just legal jargon, they determine whether you get your money back.
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Regulatory warnings are useless without action. The AMF can issue all the warnings it wants, but until concentration limits are enforced, these risks will persist.
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Systemic risks lurk everywhere. Just as global debt markets can trigger French portfolio shocks, concentrated product exposure can turn one company’s failure into a national savings crisis.
The Bottom Line
The Stellantis collapse is more than a corporate crisis, it’s a stress test for French wealth management. With €5 billion in structured product exposure, thousands of savers are about to learn a painful lesson about complexity and risk.
The question isn’t whether Stellantis will recover. The question is: how many more “safe” products are hiding similar risks? And will regulators finally act to protect French savers from the next Stellantis?
For now, the tide has gone out. And we’re seeing exactly who’s been swimming naked.
Action Steps:
1. Review all structured product holdings in your portfolio
2. Demand transparency from your CGP about barriers and decrement features
3. File complaints with the AMF if you were misled about risks
4. Consider diversifying into simpler, more transparent instruments, but be aware that even synthetic ETFs carry hidden risks
5. Understand that volatility in perceived safe-haven assets is becoming the new normal
The Stellantis story isn’t over. But for many French investors, the damage is already done, whether they know it yet or not.
